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EXECUTIVE BRANCH CZARS, WHO ARE THEY? ARE THEY
NEEDED? CAN CONGRESS DO ANYTHING ABOUT THEM?
Jonathan D. Puvak*
A czar is someone who can run it all.  In a town like Washington that
has so many fiefdoms and committees with long acronyms, calling
someone simply a ‘czar’ gets the point across.1
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INTRODUCTION
In the 1830s, Washington Globe Publisher, Frank Blair, dubbed then-President of
the Bank of the United States, Nicholas Biddle, “Czar Nicholas.”2  President Andrew
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2011; B.A., summa cum laude, Bridgewater
College, 2004. I owe tremendous thanks for the constant love and support of my wife, Caroline.
1 Susan Trausch, In This Corner; Washington Has Gone Czar Crazy; Hang on, America,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 1989, at 29 (quoting Alixe Glen, Deputy Press Secretary to President
George H. W. Bush).
2 Ben Zimmer, Czar Wars: How Did a Term for Russian Royalty Work its Way into
American Government?, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2008, 11:24 AM), http://www.slate.com/id
1091
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Jackson fundamentally opposed the centralized power of the National Bank and was
embroiled in a feud with Biddle.3  Over the course of the nineteenth century, “czar”
emerged as a “label for anyone with tyrannical tendencies.”4  Later, in the mid-twentieth
century, the term “czar” was proliferated by the media as a slang term when referring
to presidential advisors appointed to handle specific policy directives without the advice
and consent of the Senate.5
The present and previous presidential administrations of Barack Obama and
George W. Bush respectively, demonstrated a remarkable increase in the number of
non-confirmed advisors.6  For the Obama administration, the increase has resulted in
a great deal of media coverage and, in particular, sparked debate among supporters7 and
opponents,8 legislation by the United States House of Representatives,9 and congres-
sional hearings.10  Despite the proliferation, President Obama is not the first President
to appoint policy advisors; the practice dates back to 1939 and President Franklin D.
Roosevelt.11  Despite the historical recognition that some level of presidential advice
/2207055/ (discussing the historical rise and usage of “czar” in American politics in the early
twentieth century; concurrently, Russia’s own tsar “Nicholas I was at the height of his repres-
sive nationalist regime”).
3 Id. (pointing out that the feud between President Jackson and Biddle became the “Bank
War” of 1832–36).
4 Id.
5 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 455 (4th ed. 2000)
(defining “czar” as “[a] person having great power; an autocrat,” or “[a]n appointed official
having special powers to regulate or supervise an activity”); Zimmer, supra note 2.
6 See Cody M. Brown & Jeffrey D. Ratner, White House Czars: Is Congress to Blame?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion
/2009/1019/p09s04-coop.html.
7 See Mike Memoli, DNC Czar Memo, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Sept. 16, 2009), http://
realclearpolitics.blogs.time.com/dnc-czar-memo/.
8 Questions Raised Over Influence of Obama ‘Czars,’ FOXNEWS (July 13, 2009),  http://
www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/07/13/questions-raised-influence-obama-czars/; Van Jones’
9/11 Truther Past Raises Questions About Obama’s ‘Czars,’ FOXNEWS (Sept. 4, 2009),  http://
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,546602,00.html.
9 See Czar Accountability and Reform (CZAR) Act of 2009, H.R. 3226, 111th Cong.
(2009); Sunset All Czars (SAC) Act, H.R. 3569, 111th Cong. (2009); Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, H.R. 1, 112th Cong., amend. 89 (2011).
10 Presidential Advice and Senate Consent: The Past, Present, and Future of Policy
Czars: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t. Affairs, 111th Cong. 37
(statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t.
Affairs); Examining the History and Legality of Executive Branch Czars: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Const. the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 42 (2009) (statement
of Sen. Russell Feingold).
11 Presidential Advice and Senate Consent: The Past, Present, and Future of Policy
Czars: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t. Affairs, 111th Cong. 14
(2009) (statement of Harold C. Relyea, specialist in American national government with the
Congressional Research Service) [hereinafter Relyea Statement].
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is necessary, the exponential increase of czar appointments is troubling.12  This upward
trend demonstrates an unwary and unchecked expansion of the power of the executive
branch.  The public debate appears to reflect two separate, but related issues.  For
those concerned with constitutional adherence the primary issue is that the appoint-
ment of new executive branch officials and White House advisors may not be con-
sistent with the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution.13  While, for
others the practical issue is that the expansive use of czars raises accountability, legis-
lative oversight and governmental efficiency concerns.14  Both categories of issues
implicate constitutional concerns of separation of powers,15 checks and balances,16 and
doctrinal constitutional adherence.
Since taking office, President Obama has notably increased the number and
authority of advisors appointed through this controversial appointment practice,17
continuing an executive branch trend that should be controlled and slowed.  The ram-
pant increase crosses the line between positioning the President to make the most in-
formed policy decisions and abusing the executive appointment power in disregard of
constitutional principles.  The Czar Accountability and Reform Act (CZAR Act), in-
troduced in the House of Representatives in July 2009, attempts to exercise Congress’s
power over the purse in order to curb the appointment of czars.18  This legislation is
12 Brown & Ratner, supra note 6.
13 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).
14 Letter from Sen. Robert C. Byrd to President Barack Obama (Feb. 23, 2009),  available
at http://www.eenews.net/public/25/9865/features/documents/2009/02/25/document_gw_02
.pdf [hereinafter Sen. Byrd Letter]; Letter from Sen. Susan M. Collins to President Barack
Obama (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://collins.senate.gov/public/continue.cfm (follow
“Press Releases” hyperlink; then search for “September 15, 2009”) [hereinafter Sen. Collins
Letter]; Letter from Sen. Russell Feingold to President Barack Obama (Sept. 15, 2009), avail-
able at http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/59071-Feingold-questions-obama
-czars [hereinafter Sen. Feingold Letter]. Sen. Collins’s letter was also signed by Senators
Lamar Alexander, Kit Bond, Mike Crapo, Pat Roberts and Bob Bennett.
15 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
16 Id.
17 See Brown & Ratner, supra note 6.
18 See CZAR Accountability and Reform (CZAR) Act of 2009, H.R. 3226, 111th Cong.
As of January 2011, this bill never moved beyond the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform. The relevant text of the CZAR Act appears below:
To provide that appropriated funds may not be used to pay for any sal-
aries or expenses of any task force, council, or similar office which is
established by or at the direction of the President and headed by an indi-
vidual who has been inappropriately appointed to such position (on other
than an interim basis), without the advice and consent of the Senate. . . .
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a step in the correct direction towards limiting the controversial trend of presidential
czar appointments, but does not go far enough to create the accountability, govern-
ment efficiency and legislative oversight that should be required from all branches
of government.
This Note argues that legislation regulating the appointment of czars—which
would impose financial constraints, mandate legislative oversight, and provide leg-
islative removal—is necessary to minimize the constitutionality and accountability
concerns.  Part I provides a history of czar appointments by the executive branch, and
introduces several of the most prominent czar positions and their stated policy func-
tions.  Part II discusses the legitimacy of czar appointments within the case law of the
Appointments Clause and the federal appointments process.  Administrative and public
laws and regulations govern much of the processes in the appointment arena and are
discussed in this section.19  In particular, this analysis attempts to explain the consti-
tutional frictions between the czar appointments and the intended accountability and
checks and balances of the Appointments Clause.  Part III discusses current legislative
attempts to regulate and argues that the legislation does not fully alleviate public con-
cerns and, further, shows a diminished chance of actual passage.  This section sug-
gests modifications or supplemental legislation that will provide for accountability and
oversight and allow for informed and efficient executive leadership.  Additionally, this
section discusses the feasibility and impact of any suggested legislation.
I. RISE OF THE CZARS
These single-purpose administrators had the great advantage of sim-
plicity of mission.  They, their staffs and the public knew exactly what
(a) In General-Appropriated funds may not be used to pay for any sal-
aries or expenses of any task force, council, or similar office—
(1) which is established by or at the direction of the President;
and
(2) the head of which—
(A) is appointed to such position (on other than an
interim basis) without the advice and consent of the
Senate;
(B) is excepted from the competitive service by rea-
son of its confidential, policy-determining, the policy-
making, or policy-advocating character; and
(C) performs or delegates functions which (but for the
establishment of such task force, council, or similar
office) would be performed or delegated by an indi-
vidual in a position to which the President appoints
an individual by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate.
Id. § 2.
19 However, exhaustive coverage of the intricacies of administrative law in this topic area
is beyond the scope of this Note.
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they were trying to do.  In general they ‘got results.’  They ‘bulled
their way through,’ overcoming many obstacles.  But they also made
a great deal of confusion for other programs . . . 20
A. Creation and Criticism
The sixteenth century Russian meaning of “tsar” has evolved to become a collo-
quial term in American politics.21  Publisher Frank Blair introduced the term czar into
American politics,22 and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s rapid expansion of the government
and administrative reform during World War II secured a permanent home for the
term within the executive branch.23
The term czar is most commonly used by the media, but President Obama and
other government officials have, on occasion, referred to presidential advisors as
czars.24  Other government officials have spoken in opposition to referring to some-
one as a czar.  For example, Senator Joseph Lieberman has denounced the historical
usage of czar and expressed his personal discontent with the present usage of this term
to refer to those serving in specific advisor positions.25
20 LUTHER GULICK, ADMINISTRATIVE REFLECTIONS FROM WORLD WAR II, at 100 (1948)
(quoting Gulick, commenting on the President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of czardoms).
21 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 455 (4th ed. 2000)
(defining “czar” as “[a] male monarch or emperor who ruled Russia until the revolution of
1917”); Zimmer, supra note 2. “Tsar” or “Tzar” historically refers to an emperor, autocrat
or equivalent of a King. Slavic in origin,“tsar” or “czar” historically reflected images of the
tyrannical Romanov dynasty that controlled Russia from approximately 1613 to the Revolution
in 1917. Now, “czar” represents an individual with significant power or someone acting with
tyrannical tendencies. See ROBERT SERVICE, A HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA: FROM TSARISM
TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, at xxiii, 1 (3d ed. 2009).
22 See Zimmer, supra note 2.
23 Id.
24 President Barack Obama, Remarks at Urban and Metropolitan Policy Roundtable
(July 13, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks
-president-urban-and-metropolitan-roundtable) (referring to Gil Kerlikowske as the “Drug
Czar” and not his official title: Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy).
25 Presidential Advice and Senate Consent: The Past, Present, and Future of Policy
Czars: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t. Affairs, 111th Cong. 29–30
(2009) (statement of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Gov’t. Affairs).
I am sure many people here will remember the moment in the classic
story “Fiddler on the Roof” when one of the citizens of Anatevka,
Russia, asks the local rabbi, “Rabbi, is there a prayer for the czar?” And
the local rabbi answers, “Yes, my son, there is. It is ‘God bless and keep
the czar, far away from us.’” May I paraphrase that prayer this morning
and ask that God bless and keep the title of ‘czar’ forevermore away
from the American Government. I am going to try to do my best not to 
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Critics and the media use czar as a pejorative, attention-grabbing title and have
effectively increased the public criticism of czar appointments since President Obama
took office.  Legislators,26 political commentators,27 and the public at large have ex-
pressed opinions on this appointments practice.28  Eric Cantor, a Virginia Congressman,
pointed out that President Obama promised to reverse the ever increasing power of
the executive branch during his campaign rhetoric.29  Cantor maintains that Obama
failed to deliver on his promise and has instead “appoint[ed] a virtual army of ‘czars’
[and] . . . embarked on an end-run around the legislative branch of historic propor-
tions.”30  Cantor emphasizes that the broad authority of the czars presents a threat to
the system of checks and balances.31
Conservative commentator Michelle Malkin devoted an entire chapter to czars
in her 2009 book, Culture of Corruption.32  Malkin states, “[i]n effect, the Obama
administration has created a two-tiered government—fronted by Cabinet secretaries
able to withstand public scrutiny (some of them, just barely) and run behind the scenes
by shadow secretaries with broad powers beyond the reach of congressional account-
ability.”33  Although Malkin’s observations reflect her personal opinions, many of her
suggestions highlight public concerns.  Malkin and Cantor present similar arguments
in suggesting that the Obama administration has created new posts by executive orders
to avoid the potential pitfalls of the Senate nomination process.34
use the word ‘czar’ in this regard again. So from now on, I am going to try to call
the drug czar the ‘National Anti-Drug Policy Coordinator,’ the environmental czar
the ‘National Environmental Advisor,’ and the pay czar, well, today he probably
should be called the ‘National Pay Master.’”
Id.
26 See Eric Cantor, Op-Ed, Obama’s 32 Czars, WASH. POST, July 30, 2009, at A19; supra
note 14 (citing letters from members of Congress to President Obama).
27 See Van Jones’ 9/11 Truther Past Raises Questions About Obama’s ‘Czars,’ supra
note 8.
28 See We Support H.R. 3226: The Czar Accountability and Reform Act of 2009,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=231172810626#!/group.php?gid=1281
43764145 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (featuring a “common interest” Facebook group dedi-
cated to sharing thoughts about the concerns over “czar” appointments); Presidential “CZARs”
are Unconstitutional, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=231172810626
(last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (offering a public forum for opposition to new czar appointments).
29 See Cantor, supra note 26 (“The biggest problems that we’re facing right now have to do
with George Bush trying to bring more and more power into the executive branch and not go
through Congress at all. And that’s what I intend to reverse when I’m [P]resident of the United
States.” (quoting then-Senator Barack Obama)).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 MICHELLE MALKIN, CULTURE OF CORRUPTION: OBAMA AND HIS TEAM OF TAX CHEATS,
CROOKS, AND CRONIES 141 (2009).
33 Id.
34 Id.; see also Cantor, supra note 26.
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Representative Jack Kingston stands strongly opposed to the presidential appoint-
ment of czars.35  Kingston has vehemently criticized the Obama administration for
its increased appointment of advisors not confirmed by the Senate.36  His criticism
is directly targeted at the Obama administration and what Kingston believes is an
unnecessary proliferation of the appointment of non-Senate confirmed advisors.37 
Accountability and the financial resources necessary to support the advisor positions
are the targets of Kingston’s criticisms.38  Like other critics, Kingston recognizes that
the “President has the right to pick his own team and push his own agenda,” and
Congress should demand “transparency, accountability and balance.”39  Kingston ad-
vocates adherence to the framework of the Appointments Clause because he believes
the structure offers the appropriate middle ground to allow the President his freedom,
but places a sensible limit on such freedom.40
Criticism not only arises from Republicans and conservative commentators, as
Democratic leaders including the late Sen. Robert Byrd and former Sen. Russell
Feingold have also raised similar concerns directly to President Obama.41  Statistics
demonstrate that the Bush and Obama administrations have continued to expand the
number of policy-specific, non-Senate confirmed advisors, but, historically, other presi-
dential administrations have varied in the appointments of policy specific advisors.42
35 Jack Kingston, Who Czar They? President Obama’s Czars Leave More Questions
Than Answers (July 27, 2009), available at http://kingston.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle
.aspx?DocumentID=139512. Representative Kingston (R-GA), as a member of the House
Appropriations Committee, has extensively criticized the Obama administration’s appointment
of czars. Kingston introduced the Czar Accountability and Reform Act in the United States
House of Representatives in July 2009. Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
Who are these people and why are they necessary? . . . What qualifies
a college professor to set executive salaries? We don’t know the an-
swers to these questions because unlike cabinet secretaries, judges, and
hundreds of other presidential appointments, these czars have bypassed
Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution which mandates the advice
and consent of the Senate when the President appoints principle officers.
Since these czars are the President’s point persons—many only reporting
directly to him—on important issues, coming before the Senate for con-
firmation hearings would be important . . . [t]ransparency isn’t the only
issue. In these times of tight budgets, we need to know what these new
offices are going to cost us. Most czars make $172,000. Each has an
office, a staff, transportation and travel budgets. Who’s watching this?
Id. For more information on the salaries and financial concerns of czars, visit Rep. Kingston’s
website at http://kingston.house.gov/czar/.
38 See Kingston, supra note 35.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See Letter from Byrd, supra note 14; Letter from Feingold, supra note 14.
42 Randy James, A Brief History of White House Czars, TIME, Sept. 23, 2009, available
at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1925564,00.html; Nancy Matthis, The
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B. Varied Presidential Use of Czars
Czar appointments have steadily increased since their inception in the middle
of the twentieth century, though some presidential administrations have appointed
more than others.  The waves of usage appear to transcend party lines, with some
Democrat and Republican administrations expanding the use and others just main-
taining or declining to appoint.43  Some presidents have frequently appointed czars
while others have declined their use entirely.44  Presidents Nixon, Reagan, Carter,
H.W. Bush and Clinton each had far fewer czar positions than either George W. Bush
or Barack Obama.45  By some accounts, President Obama has as many as forty-four
czars,46 either newly appointed or held over from the previous Bush administration.47 
Regardless of holdovers, President Obama has increased the number of new appoint-
ments by at least ten.48
C. Meet the Current Czars
The broad policy functions of many of the current Obama administration czars
can generally be derived from their titles.  Some of the present czar positions include:
Car, Counterterrorism, Energy, Health, Science, and Trade.49  Others appear to have
more specific functions, such as: Afghan-Pakistan, AIDS, Food, Government Perfor-
mance, Great Lakes, Green Jobs, Guantanamo Closure, Health, Mideast Peace, Mid-
east Policy, Pay, Domestic Violence, Safe Schools, Troubled Asset Relief Program
Compleat List of Czars, AM. DAUGHTER (Aug. 3, 2009, 6:05 AM), http://frontpage.american
daughter.com/?p=2385.
43 See James, supra note 42; Matthis, supra note 42.
44 James K. Glassman, Close, But No Big Czar, REASON, Dec. 18, 2000, available at
http://reason.com/archives/2000/12/18/close-but-no-big-czar (reflecting that history shows
that Roosevelt created the first czar position, but commentators disagree on which “modern”
President appointed the first czar (Nixon or Reagan) (in this respect czar refers to someone
appointed by the President without Senate confirmation who provides advice on a specific
policy issue)).
45 Examining the History and Legality of Executive Branch Czars: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Matthew Spalding, Director,
B. Kenneth Simon Center for American Studies, Heritage Foundation).
46 News Release, Rep. Patrick T. McHenry, Rep. McHenry: 44 Czars Must Testify Before
Congress (Sept. 10, 2009), available at 2009 WLNR 17706185 (referencing a letter from Rep.
Patrick T. McHenry to Rep. Edolphus Towns, Chairman of House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform requesting a congressional hearing on czars).
47 See Matthis, supra note 42.
48 Letter from Gregory B. Craig, Counsel to the President, to Sen. Russell Feingold
(Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/
10/feingoldletter.pdf.
49 Cantor, supra note 26, Matthis, supra note 42 (providing updated list of all the czars
currently serving in the Obama administration).
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(TARP), Water, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).50  Each of these positions
are currently occupied.51
Notably, the presidential cabinet consists of the Vice-President and the secretaries
of fifteen executive departments including: Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Educa-
tion, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban
Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans
Affairs.52  Comparison of cabinet-level positions and czar positions reveals a sub-
stantial overlap.  For example, consider that there is an Energy Czar and a Secretary of
Energy, a Secretary of Labor and a Pay Czar, and a Secretary of State and a Mideast
Peace Czar.
In recent months, some czars have received greater notoriety and media coverage
than others.  Kenneth Feinberg, the once “Pay Czar” provides a prominent current
example.53  The Obama administration appointed Feinberg as the Special Master of
Compensation in June 2009, to handle concerns over executive compensation for
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients.54  TARP was created under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,55 in which Congress directed the
Treasury Department to ensure that all TARP recipients implement acceptable stan-
dards for executive compensation.56  Feinberg was appointed to determine and set
compensation for the recipients of the TARP funding.57  Feinberg was appointed, like
most other czars, without Senate confirmation.58  The actions of Feinberg have drawn
the greatest constitutional criticism because he has exercised significant legal authority
50 See Cantor, supra note 26; Matthis, supra note 42.
51 Cantor, supra note 26; Matthis, supra note 42.
52 The Cabinet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet/ (last visited Apr. 10,
2011).
53 Blank Rome Government Relations, Obama Introduces ‘Pay Czar’ and ‘Say on Pay,’
FINANCIAL REFORM WATCH (June 10, 2009), http://www.financialreformwatch.com/2009/
06/articles/executive-pay/obama-introduces-pay-czar-and-say-on-pay/.
54 TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance 74 Fed. Reg. 28, 394
(Jun. 15, 2009) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.30 (2011)); see also Michael W. McConnell, Op-Ed,
The Pay Czar is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at A25.
55 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 112
Stat. 3765 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 28, 29, 30, 21, 42, 43, and
49 U.S.C.); see also Investment Programs, Financial Stability, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/Pages/default
.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (explaining that the purpose of EESA was to prevent further
economic collapse and TARP was designed to stabilize the United States financial system).
56 See McConnell, supra note 54.
57 Id. (“Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner created the office of ‘Special Master’ for
compensation, delegated his TARP authority to set compensation standards to this officer, and
appointed Mr. Feinberg (a lawyer and mediator) to this position, without obtaining Senate
confirmation.”).
58 Id.
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by issuing regulations that carry the force of law.59  The implications of Feinberg’s
actions are discussed in further detail in Part II. C.
Currently, more than 1,200 executive branch positions require Senate confirma-
tion.60  This high number creates an administrative roadblock for appointees.  Recent
presidential administrations have spent the majority of their first year in office attempt-
ing to fill positions, but forty years ago, a President could appoint a full staff in two or
three months.61  Such a daunting task can be costly for a new administration eager to
institute new polices.  The presidential headaches of dealing with the appointments
process help to explain the proliferation in the appointment of advisors without the
advice and consent of the Senate.  Although these practical concerns present a compel-
ling argument to permit the expansion of non-confirmed appointments, the constitu-
tional structure should not be ignored.  An evaluation of the Appointments Clause and
subsequent precedents allow for a better understanding of how the czar appointments
fit into the long-established constitutional framework.
As suggested by members of Congress, scholars, and the public, the appointment
of a large number of high-ranking officers presents the potential upheaval of the checks
and balances system and a dilemma between two viewpoints.62  First, absent account-
ability, these advisors are left to advance policy and largely dictate the agenda of social
directives.  Second, the President should be encouraged to surround himself with the
“best and brightest” individuals to advise him on his most important decisions.63
II. EXECUTIVE BRANCH APPOINTMENTS
It is the business of removal and appointment which presents the
serious difficulties.  All others compared with these, are as nothing.64
A. Appointments WITH the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate65
The appointments process has long been a troubling area for Presidents,66
even though the vast majority of executive branch positions are filled by political
59 Ben Votava, “Pay Czar” Could Bring First Legal Challenge for Constitutionality of
Appointees, EXAMINER, (Oct. 22, 2009, 8:04 PM), http://www.examiner.com/dupage-county
-libertarian-in-chicago/pay-czar-could-bring-first-legal-challenge-for-constitutionality-of
-appointees.
60 See Jeff McDermott, Reform of the Presidential Appointment Process, 56 FED. LAWYER
6 (2009).
61 Id. (“[W]hat took two and one-half months for President John F. Kennedy took President
George W. Bush nearly nine months.”).
62 See supra Part I.A.
63 See McDermott, supra note 60, at 24.
64 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, at  xiii (2003) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
65 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
66 See GERHARDT, supra note 64, at xv–xvii.
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appointment.67  While Presidents are elected without formal requirement of prior
federal government service, the only required qualification for political appointees
is the Senate confirmation process.68  The intention is that the Senate will sort out and
select those most qualified for these important governmental positions.  The execu-
tive branch includes thousands of positions that are directly or indirectly appointed
by the President.69  Some of these positions are housed within the White House and
others among executive branch agencies such as the Departments of State, Treasury,
Homeland Security, Labor, and the Environmental Protection Agency.70
The United States Constitution provides only Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, to
dictate the appointment of officers.71  As noted by commentators, the appointment
is a single mechanism: presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.72  This
structure provides no explicit recognition of exceptions and appears to apply broadly
to all officials, regardless of their status or power.73  Further, there is a “presumption
of confirmation that works to the advantage of the president and his nominees.”74 
Only a majority of Senate votes are required for approval, much less than other con-
stitutional provisions that require two-thirds.75  The presumption of confirmation re-
sults from the practical difficulty for a small group of Senators to garner the necessary
support to block a seemingly qualified nominee.76  The President can work proactively
to staff “influential federal offices with people committed to his political or constitu-
tional views.”77
The Framers’ intent for balance between executive power and congressional en-
croachment is embodied in the structure of the Appointments Clause.78  “The Framers
anticipated that the President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and
67 See G. Calvin Mackenzie, The State of the Presidential Appointments Process, in
INNOCENT UNTIL NOMINATED: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS 2 (G. Calvin Mackenzie ed., 2001); DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL
APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 2–8 (2008).
68 Mackenzie, supra note 67, at 2.
69 See McDermott, supra note 60.
70 The Executive Branch, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government
/executive-branch (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (providing a list of all of the Executive branch
agencies and their stated missions); Official U.S. Executive Branch Web Sites, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/news/fedgov.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
71 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
72 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 39 (2003).
73 Id. at 40.
74 Id. at 41 (explaining that the standard for approval for nominees is much lower than other
legislative action, like passage of laws or treaties).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 42.
77 Id. at 43.
78 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
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personal favoritism than would a collective body.”79  By providing the appointment
power only to the President, “[t]he sole and undivided responsibility of one man will
naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation.”80  The
presidential nomination provision provides executive autonomy, but the “Advice and
Consent”81 requirement prevents executive abuses and promotes “a judicious choice of
[persons] for filling the offices of the Union.”82  In The Federalist Papers, Alexander
Hamilton noted:
The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president
singly and absolutely.  The censure of rejecting a good one would
lie entirely at the door of the senate. . . .  If an ill appointment
should be made the executive for nominating and the senate for
approving would participate though in different degrees in the
opprobrium and disgrace.83
Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation is the default appointment
mechanism, but the last portion of Clause 2 provides another appointment mechanism
that allows Congress to deviate from presidential nomination.84  This last portion of
the clause is often referred to as the “Excepting Clause,”85 and the Supreme Court has
noted that the purpose of the Excepting Clause was administrative convenience.86 
However, the Court, in United States v. Germaine, clarified that administrative con-
venience only applies to the appointment of “inferior” officers.87
Some authors have explained the Appointments Clause as embodying two related
clauses that create two distinct appointment procedures.88  These distinct procedures,
as explained above, are: “presidential nomination and Senate confirmation as the
default method, and vesting in one of three authorized appointers as an optional alter-
native method for certain types of officers.”89
79 Id.
80 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 510–11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
81 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
82 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 80, at 510 (Alexander Hamilton).
83 THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 80, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton).
84 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[B]ut the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments”).
85 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997).
86 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878).
87 Id.
88 See Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications
for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 748–51 (2008).
89 Id. at 745 (examining the two related clauses and the requirements of each respective
appointments process). See generally 91 C.J.S. United States § 53 (2010) (providing case cita-
tions dealing with specific issues relating to the appointments process such as: “purpose,” the
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The boundaries of the Appointments Clause have been the topic of both signifi-
cant debate and litigation.  The Appointments Clause refers to “Officers of the United
States,” and several cases have wrestled with a definition of “Officer” and attempted
to draw a distinction between “principal” and “inferior” officer.90  The text of the
Appointments Clause makes a distinction between officers and “inferior” officers,
permitting Congress to “vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”91 
The Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, found that the phrase “Officers of the United States”
was “intended to have [a] substantive meaning” and stated that “[w]e think its fair
import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States is an ‘Officer of the United States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in
the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article.”92
The conclusion in Buckley follows from the two-class framework articulated in
United States v. Germaine: one class requiring presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation and an inferior class of officers whose appointment is otherwise.93  How-
ever, the Supreme Court has noted that the Buckley decision is helpful in marking
the line between officer and non-officer, but does not mark the line between principal
and inferior officer.94  But, under the Buckley framework, an “Officer of the United
States” is someone who exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States.”95
Other cases have specifically pronounced whether a particular office is or is not
inferior, but none have set forth a definitive test to determine if an office is “inferior”
under the Appointments Clause.96  In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court wrestled
with the distinction between principal and inferior officer.97  At issue in Morrison was
“[d]istinction between officer and non-officer,” “‘[i]nferior officer’ defined,” and “[a]ppointee
exercising significant authority is officer and must be appointed”); Adam J. White, Toward
the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2005) (detailing the historical origins of the Appointments
Clause and the ratification process).
90 See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662–63; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976); Hobson
v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 912–14 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
91 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
92 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
93 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878).
94 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126).
95 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
96 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 669–72 (1988) (holding that the independent
counsel created by the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act was an inferior officer);
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–32 (1935) (discussing legislative en-
croachment on the executive removal and appointment power); Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 114, 176 (1926) (holding that the President has the sole removal power); Ex parte
Hennen, 38 U.S. 225, 228–29 (1839) (wrestling with the judicial power to remove).
97 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–72.
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the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which provided for the appointment of an
independent counsel to investigate and prosecute government officials for violations
of federal criminal laws.98  The Act permitted the Attorney General to request the
appointment of an independent counsel, and a panel consisting of three Federal judges
would select the counsel and define her jurisdiction.99  The independent counsel was
vested with broad powers, but could be removed for cause by the Attorney General.100 
Independent counsel, Alexia Morrison, was appointed to investigate Ted Olson,
Assistant Attorney General, for providing false and misleading testimony to a House
committee.101  Olson challenged the constitutionality of the independent counsel ap-
pointment.102  Since the Ethics and Government Act did not provide for nomination
by “the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,” the Court had to decide
if the independent counsel was an inferior officer.103  The Court analyzed the indepen-
dent counsel using four factors and concluded that Morrison was an inferior officer.104 
The four factors that supported the Court’s decision were: “First, [Morrison] is subject
to removal by a higher Executive Branch official. . . .  Second, [Morrison] is empow-
ered by the Act to perform only certain, limited duties. . . .  Third, [Morrison’s] office
is limited in jurisdiction . . . .  Finally, [Morrison’s] office is limited in tenure.”105 
Justice Scalia dissented in Morrison because of the use of these four factors and in-
stead promulgated a test premised on a literal interpretation of “inferior.”106  Justice
Scalia’s literal interpretation test became the basis for the majority opinion in Edmond
v. United States.107
The Morrison Court did not purport to define a test to determine an “inferior”
officer.  However, in Edmond v. United States, the Court recognized the Framers’
intentional design of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 to preserve political accountability
and stated that “we think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is
directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”108
Edmond involved the appointment of two civilian judges by the Secretary of
Transportation.109  The statute provided the Secretary the power to appoint department
98 Id. at 659–60.
99 Id. at 661.
100 Id. at 663.
101 Id. at 665–67 (Morrison was a replacement independent counsel after James C. McKay
resigned).
102 Id. at 668.
103 Andrew Croner, Annual Review of Administrative Law: Morrison, Edmond, and the
Power of Appointments, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1002, 1008 (2009).
104 Id. at 1008–09; see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72.
105 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72.
106 Croner, supra note 103, at 1009.
107 See 520 U.S. 651, at 662–63.
108 Id. at 663.
109 Id. at 655–56.
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officials.110  The Court found that not only were the civilian judges supervised by the
Judge Advocate General, but also that the judges could be removed from their judicial
assignment without cause by the Judge Advocate General.111  The supervision and
the removal power were enough to classify the civilian judges as “inferior officers”
within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.112
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, applied the rationale of Edmond and determined that
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s oversight of the Board was sufficient to
render the Board members inferior officers.113
The decisions in Buckley, Morrison, Edmond, and Free Enterprise Fund, argu-
ably, provide a framework to determine the proper classification of officers within the
context of the Appointments Clause.  As Morrison and Edmond remain the two most
important decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the inferior and principal officer
distinction,114 Part II.C below compares this case law to the czar appointments.
B. Appointments WITHOUT the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate
Presidents are continually faced with specialized problems and often address
these issues by appointing individuals to coordinate their efforts.115  Czar appoint-
ments purport to operate within the Appointments Clause framework, but this appoint-
ment process also has roots in various administrative and public laws and presidential
executive orders.
President George Washington quickly formed a close circle of advisors to provide
administrative assistance on both management and advice.116  This group arrangement
spawned the cabinet.117  Subsequent Presidents utilized the cabinet to varying degrees,
but the federal government began to change in the early twentieth century.118  New
agencies and departments of government regulation gave rise to the administrative
110 49 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2006) (“The Secretary of Transportation may appoint and fix the
pay of officers and employees of the Department of Transportation and may prescribe their
duties and powers.”).
111 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664.
112 Id. at 666.
113 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3139, 3162 (2010).
114 See Croner, supra note 103, at 1004.
115 BRADLEY H. PATTERSON, JR., THE RING OF POWER: THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF AND ITS
EXPANDING ROLE IN GOVERNMENT 273 (1988) (“Presidents are spurred to appoint czars when
three incendiary elements converge: if action is needed, time is short, and several federal agen-
cies must contribute to the urgent enterprise. If there is a hint of failure having occurred, and
if political flak is exploding, the White House is doubly pressed to dramatize the president’s
personal concern and to center the needed initiative within his own perimeter.”).
116 Relyea Statement, supra note 11, at 1.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 2–3.
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state.119  President Franklin D. Roosevelt began his second term in 1937 and sought
to undertake administrative reform and specifically, a reorganization of the execu-
tive branch.120  Roosevelt intended “to improve the President’s ability to manage the
executive branch.”121  Out of this reform movement came committee reports that dis-
cussed the power and authority of presidential assistants.122  The report stated that the
assistants’ functions would be “to guide . . . [the President] in making his responsible
decisions,” but clearly stated that the assistants “would remain in the background,
issue no orders, make no decisions, emit no public statements.”123
On September 8, 1939, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8248, formally orga-
nizing the Executive Office of the President (EOP).124  Order 8248 took the first step
towards federal coordination by creating the White House Office (WHO) and consol-
idating other executive agencies.125  Preparation for World War II provided Roosevelt
the flexibility to place agents, special assistants, and close advisors into different agen-
cies, especially the WHO.126  During the remainder of World War II, Roosevelt con-
tinued to use his new administrative system to surround himself with advisors, and
some believed that EOP allowed for a more coordinated war effort.127
Roosevelt and his successor, Truman, appointed many individuals and granted
them broad authority, but Congress recognized the accountability concerns and reacted
119 Id. at 3. The Progressive Movement brought greater intervention and regulation by the
government into sectors of the American economy. The Department of Labor and the Federal
Reserve were established in 1913 and additional administrative agencies were created from
this time through the Great Depression and New Deal. Id.
120 Id. at 4.
121 Id.
122 THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A
REPORT ON REORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, S.
DOC. NO. 8-75, at 19 (1937). The report suggested organizing all of the executive branch
agencies under one of the existing cabinet departments and increasing the president’s staff
to include “a small number of executive assistants who would be his direct aides in dealing with
the managerial agencies and administrative departments of the Government.” However, the
report pointed out that the aides “would have no power to make decisions or issue instructions
in their own right” and “[t]hey would not be assistant presidents in any sense.” Id.
123 Id.
124 Exec. Order No. 8248, 3 C.F.R. 576 (1938–1943) (“[e]stablishing the divisions of the
Executive Office of the President and defining their functions and duties . . . .”).
125 Relyea Statement, supra note 11, at 5–6. The Bureau of the Budget, the National
Resources Planning Board, and the Office for Emergency Management were several of the
agencies created by Executive Order 8248 or later orders amending it. Id.
126 Id. at 6 (describing the rising number of assistants with unclear position descriptions
and authority).
127 Id. at 7 (quoting Luther Gulick, a Roosevelt advisor and member of the President’s
Committee on Administrative Management, as saying “Where would we have been in this
war without the Executive Office of the President . . . no one can question the extraordinary
total effectiveness of the Presidency under the administrative system which we had through
the war years.”).
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through legislation and investigation.  One example of congressional legislation was
the creation of an independent agency that significantly overlapped with the authori-
ties of a president-created agency.128  Congress permitted the President to nominate
the new director, subject to Senate confirmation, and limited the director’s term to two
years.129  Upon signing the law, Roosevelt cooperated and transferred the functions of
his agency to the new legislatively created agency.130
Later presidents continued Roosevelt’s appointment practice, and during the
Nixon administration, some commentators again recognized the overlap of authority
between presidential assistants and Cabinet Secretaries.131  Presidential policymakers
were becoming more and more influential, but there was no accountability to Congress. 
Nixon’s appointment of Henry Kissinger provides an example because Kissinger, as
National Security Advisor, undermined the Department of State and refused to testify
before Congress.132  Congress attempted to increase accountability by providing restric-
tions on funding.133  Presidents have found ways to continue the practice by exercising
executive privilege or finding other sources of funding.134
Another important consideration is Public Law 95-570, passed in 1978,135 which
gives the president the power to create his staff and to set their compensation in accor-
dance with executive branch pay scales found elsewhere in the United States Code.136 
The text of this law limits the assistants to only the White House Office, but permits
appointment “without regard to any other provision of law regulating the employment
or compensation of persons in the Government service.  Employees so appointed shall
perform such official duties as the President may prescribe.”137  Public Law 95-570
provides the President the ability to appoint staff to assist in his daily functions and
maintenance care for the White House itself.  Despite the specific language and intent,
the language reflects a congressional recognition that the President must be given
128 Id. at 11–12 (discussing the Office of War Mobilization, headed by James F. Byrnes, and
the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the similar agency created by Congress
in 1944).
129 Id. at 12.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 15 (former White House Press Secretary George Reedy commenting on the
increasing authority and influence of the WHO staff).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 16. At the end of the Second World War, Congress enacted legislation that
prevented agencies in existence for more than one year from using appropriated funds with-
out a specific appropriation or authorization by law. This functions as a check on new EOP
agencies. Id. at 17. However, agencies still exist within the EOP that do not have specific
authorizations. Id.
134 Id. at 17.
135 Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-570, 92 Stat. 2445 (codified at 3 U.S.C. §§ 105–106
(2006)). Section 105 has been amended several times since its passage during the Truman admin-
istration in 1949, and has been relied upon for the appointment of advisors.
136 3 U.S.C. § 105; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 5313–5314, 5332 (2006).
137 3 U.S.C. § 105(a).
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flexibility to appoint assistants and provides explicit funding for such presidential
assistants.138  Even though this law was designed to trump other laws regulating em-
ployment of government service, it cannot proscribe a practice that is inconsistent with
the Constitution.  Nonetheless, this legislation supports at least some congressional
acquiescence to the President’s power to appoint assistants and has been used to appoint
positions like the National Security Adviser and National Security Council staff.139
C. Czars and the Appointments Clause
1. Executive Branch Viewpoint on Czar Appointments
With this overview of the administrative and interpretative framework, the legal
status of the czar appointments can be further examined.  The Obama administration
responded to congressional concerns and relied on tradition to support the appointment
of policy advisors, stating:
Neither the purpose nor the effect of these new positions is to
supplant or replace existing federal agencies or departments, but
rather to help coordinate their efforts and help devise comprehen-
sive solutions to complex problems.  Every President has struc-
tured his staff in this manner . . . .  This is, and always has been,
the traditional role of White House staff.140
Relying on an Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion drafted during the George W.
Bush administration, Obama’s advisors concluded that none of the appointed officials
qualify as “Officers of the United States” because they do not exercise any independ-
ent authority or sovereign power.141  The OLC opinion examines the judicial opinions
concerning the Appointments Clause and articulates its own test to support their defi-
nition of an “Officer of the United States.”142  According to the opinion, to be subject
to the Appointments Clause, a federal office must have two essential characteristics:
“(1) it is invested by legal authority with a portion of the sovereign powers of the fed-
eral Government, and (2) it is ‘continuing.’”143  The memorandum explains that legal
authority is the ability to “bind[ ] the Government or third parties for the benefit of the
public, such as by administering, executing, or authoritatively interpreting the laws.”144 
138 Id.
139 Thomas M. Franck, Comment, The Constitutional and Legal Position of the National
Security Adviser and Deputy Adviser, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 634, 635 (1980).
140 See Letter from Gregory B. Craig, supra note 48 (emphasis in original).
141 See Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C.
1, 4 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007/appointmentsclausev10.pdf.
142 Id. at 1.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 4. The opinion points out that someone who serves in a purely advisory role and
thus, should have no legal authority “does not hold a position with delegated sovereign
authority of the federal Government and therefore does not hold a federal office.” Id.
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An office is “continuing” when it “is permanent or that, even though temporary, it
is not personal, ‘transient,’ or ‘incidental.’”145  Additionally, the opinion indicates
that non-continuing offices need not be appointed in accordance with the Appoint-
ments Clause, “even if they temporarily exercise delegated sovereign authority.”146 
OLC concludes that when these two characteristics—invested with independent legal
authority and continuing—are present, then the person holding the position is viewed
as an officer of the United States and must be appointed under the framework of the
Appointments Clause.147
Despite OLC’s conclusion, the constitutionality of czars remains debatable.  The
opinion makes an interesting distinction and seems to encourage the appointment
of temporary positions of authority because, in the OLC’s opinion, these individuals
fall outside of the requirements of the Appointments Clause.  Conversely, a czar
appointee, like Kenneth Feinberg, seems to fit the OLC definition of an “Officer of
the United States” because he is invested with legal authority and his appointment
is “continuing.”148
2. Edmond, Morrison, and Czar Appointments
The most popular defense of czar appointments is that these individuals serve
purely advisory roles.149  At a Senate committee hearing in October 2009 on the his-
tory and legality of executive branch czar appointments, governmental experts pro-
vided their own analyses on the constitutionality of czar appointments.150  Multiple
commentators testified that as long as the czars/advisors do not exercise legal author-
ity, then there is no constitutional concern over their appointment.151  As noted above,
the OLC opinion memorandum, written in 2007, proceeds along a similar line of
reasoning.  However, recent actions by individuals in czar positions, in particular the
“Pay Czar,” Kenneth Feinberg, blur the line between purely advisory roles and the
exercise of significant legal authority.152  In October 2009, Feinberg announced his
first round of limitations on executive salaries.153  This first round of rulings limited
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1.
148 See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (discussing the legal authority and activ-
ities of Pay Czar Kenneth Feinberg); infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text (same).
149 See Letter from Gregory B. Craig, supra note 48 (stating that the “[Czars’] one and
only role is to advise the President”).
150 See Presidential Advice and Senate Consent: The Past, Present, and Future of Policy
Czars: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong.
9–16 (2009) [hereinafter Presidential Advice and Senate Consent].
151 Id.
152 See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and appointment
of the “Pay Czar”).
153 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Special Master for TARP Exec.
Comp. Issues First Rulings (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
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the compensation for the top twenty-five employees at each of the TARP recipient
firms.154  Again, in December 2009, Feinberg further asserted his authority by extend-
ing his salary caps to reach more executive salaries.155  These decisions by Feinberg
were not recommendations, but rather regulations that carried the force of law to any
recipient of TARP funds.156  Feinberg unilaterally made these decisions, which were
promulgated and enforced by the Department of the Treasury.  These actions give cre-
dence to criticism and countenance against a finding that Feinberg is serving in a purely
advisory rule.  Turning to the case law of Edmond and Morrison,157 an evaluation of
the approaches taken by the Court in both these situations demonstrates the question-
able constitutional status of czar appointees like Feinberg.  Recall, the four factors that
supported the Court’s inferior officer finding in Morrison: “[f]irst, appellant is sub-
ject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official. . . .  Second, appellant is em-
powered by the Act to perform only certain, limited duties. . . .  Third, appellant’s
office is limited in jurisdiction. . . .  Finally, appellant’s office is limited in tenure.”158 
Applying these four factors to Feinberg’s authority: Feinberg is subject to removal by
a higher executive branch official (i.e., the President or Secretary of Treasury) and his
duties are to be limited to executive compensation.159  The first two factors support a
finding that Feinberg is acting as more of an inferior officer.  However, the final two
factors, jurisdiction and tenure, suggest principal authority.  Feinberg has set limitations
on executive compensation in the entire financial sector and his appointment included
no specific end date.160  Feinberg’s position could become permanent depending on the
repayment of TARP funds and Feinberg or his successor could continue to promulgate
further limitations and potentially extend his reach beyond presidential advice.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court specifically stated that “any appointee
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer
of the United States,’” and should be appointed in accordance with the Appointments
Clause.161  As shown above, Feinberg has asserted governmental authority into the
press-releases/Pages/2009102616583827419.aspx; Eamon Javers, ‘Pay Czar’ Caps Pay of
Midlevel Execs, POLITICO (Dec. 11, 2009, 5:58 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
1209/30480.html.
154 See Javers, supra note 153.
155 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Special Master for TARP Exec.
Comp. Rules On Comp. Structures for Certain Exec. Officers and Most Highly Compensated
Emps. 26–100 (Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press
-releases/Pages/2009121111464313585.aspx.
156 Javers, supra note 153.
157 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
158 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72.
159 TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28, 394
(Jun. 15, 2009) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30 (2011)) (discussing the appointment of a Special
Master for TARP Executive Compensation and delegating authority directly to Feinberg to
oversee and create regulations concerning executive compensation).
160 See id.; Presidential Advice and Consent, supra note 150, at 2.
161 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
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private sector by limiting executive TARP recipient salaries under the authority of
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.162  Feinberg’s broad exercise of
unchecked power, under this analysis, suggests status as a “principal officer of the
United States” and his appointment should only be upheld if confirmed by the Senate.
The simpler approach of the Edmond Court may also suggest that Feinberg should
qualify as a principal officer.163  Although subject to removal by the Secretary of Trea-
sury or the President, there has been no evidence of direct oversight of his actions.164 
Edmond defined an inferior officer as someone “whose work is directed and super-
vised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the
advice and consent of the Senate.”165  Mr. Feinberg directly stated his regulations and
did not channel them through the Secretary.166  Conversely, room for interpretation
exists and if some oversight were evident this would suggest that Feinberg is within
the definition of an inferior officer as articulated in Edmond.167  While Feinberg pro-
vides a viable example for this analysis, closer inspection of the activities of other czar
appointees may lead to similar conclusions.
3. Policy Considerations of Czars
Beyond the constitutional argument lies a more practical argument as to whether
the appointment of czars actually benefits the efficiency and operation of the Govern-
ment.  Traditionally, presidents have surrounded themselves with individuals to aid
in their decision-making.168  To a certain extent, Congress has acknowledged the need
for presidential advice and permitted the tradition to continue.169  Despite the historical
acquiescence, at times, members of Congress have raised concerns for accountability
and congressional oversight.170  Presidents have argued that close advisors assist in
“addressing important matters of great public concern” and are more readily able to
engage problems because of their specific focus.171  The policy debate continues as the
162 See Javers, supra note 153.
163 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997); supra notes 108–10 and
accompanying text (discussing Edmond).
164 See 31 C.F.R. § 30.16 (“[T]he final determination of the Special Master shall be final
and binding and treated as the determination of the Treasury.”); Whether the Special Master
for Troubled Asset Relief Program Executive Compensation Is a Principal Officer under the
Appointments Clause 34 Op. O.L.C. 1, 11 (2010) (including the argument of the OLC that
the lack of express oversight is not determinative).
165 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
166 See Whether the Special Master for Troubled Asset Relief Program Executive Compen-
sation Is a Principal Officer under the Appointments Clause, supra note 164.
167 Id.
168 See Relyea Statement, supra note 11, at 1–3.
169 See Letter from Gregory B. Craig, supra note 48, at 3 (helping the President to address
“pressing challenges . . . always has been, the traditional role of White House staff”).
170 See Byrd Letter, supra note 14; Collins Letter, supra note 14.
171 See Letter from Gregory B. Craig, supra note 48, at 3.
1112 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1091
ability to dispatch an individual with a narrow direction allows a president to demon-
strate his concern for the particular issue without getting too personally involved.
III. RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION
A. Review of Proposed and Pending Legislation172
To date, Congress has initiated several pieces of legislation to remedy its concern
about czars.  The CZAR Act of 2009 intended to inhibit the use of czar appointments
by limiting their funding.173  The Sunset All Czars Act (SAC Act), introduced in the
House of Representatives in September 2009, aimed to remove any individual that is
not confirmed by the Senate by December 31, 2009.174  Most recently, in February
2011, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to their continuing resolu-
tion spending bill that eliminates funding for several czar positions, including among
others, the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation.175
All pieces of legislation were written to limit the functions and funding of non-
Senate confirmed individuals.  Specifically, the CZAR Act would have prohibited
funding for any individual or department that was created by the President without the
advice and consent of the Senate and performs a function that could be completed by
an individual or agency that is subject to Senate confirmation.176  The plain meaning
of this legislation appeared to be that the President should not appoint someone to
do a job when someone else (previously nominated and confirmed by the Senate) is
capable of doing the job.  This duplicative appointment structure exists throughout the
executive branch and in some instances, the duplication is intentional.177  The attempt
to eliminate funding is Congress’s most effective tool and was successfully exercised
by Congress following World War II.178
The SAC Act aimed “to provide a sunset date for all presidentially appointed czars,
to require Senate confirmation of those positions, and to provide that appropriated
172 See Czar Accountability and Reform (CZAR) Act of 2009, H.R. 3226, 111th Cong.;
Sunset All Czars (SAC) Act, H.R. 3569, 111th Cong. (2009); Full-Year Continuing Appro-
priations Act, H.R. 1, 112th Cong, amend. 89 (2011).
173 See H.R. 3226.
174 H.R. 3569 § 4.
175 Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R. 1, 112th Cong, amend. 89 (2011).
176 H.R. 3226 § 2(a)(2)(c).
177 See Relyea Statement, supra note 11, at 8, 14 (“A White House advisor may see a
departmental problem in a wider context than a Secretary” (quoting THEODORE SORENSEN,
DECISION-MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE OLIVE BRANCH OR THE ARROWS 71–72
(Columbia University Press 1963))); Tom Hamburger & Christi Parsons, White House Czar
Inflation Stirs Concern, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at A1 (noting the overlap between the
healthcare czar and the recently appointed Health and Human Services Secretary).
178 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing successful historical congres-
sional attempts at limiting funding for some appointees).
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funds may not be used to pay for any salaries and expenses associated with those
positions.”179  The language of the SAC Act was very similar to the CZAR Act.  How-
ever, the SAC Act raised the issue of removal.180  Removal is an important and much
analyzed congressional restriction on the executive branch’s power.181
Neither the CZAR Act or the SAC Act left the respective committees to which
they were referred upon introduction.182  With the close of the 111th Congressional
term, both pieces of legislation were cleared from the books.  However, politicians still
show a concern as demonstrated by the passage of the recent amendment to the con-
tinuing resolution.183  Although clear of the House of Representatives, the amendment
must still survive the Senate.184  Both the CZAR and SAC Act were steps in a direction
to curb the upward trend of czar appointments, however, several changes could be in-
cluded in order to balance the accountability, executive efficiency, and legislative over-
sight.  The amendment offered by Rep. Steve Scalise (R-La) is a more direct approach
by enumerating particular positions and eliminating funding for czars’ salaries.
B. Suggested Changes to Improve the Pending and Proposed Legislation
As discussed above, the constitutional implications of the appointment of czars are
debatable.185  Regardless of which side of the debate prevails, Congress could alleviate
their concerns over the increased number of czars by reintroducing and amending the
prior legislation or by creating new legislation that imposes additional restrictions. 
Effective restrictions or requirements should allow the President to surround himself
with the number of advisors that he deems necessary, but also provide Congress with
constitutionally mandated tools of oversight.  The text and structure of the Appoint-
ments Clause recognizes that the President has the power to appoint, but the separation
of powers and checks and balances mechanism contemplated by the framers should
not be ignored.
In order to strike a balance between the executive and legislative branches, when
the President chooses to appoint without the advice and consent of the Senate and
179 H.R. 3569.
180 Id.§ 4.
181 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 626 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (the power to appoint
implies the power to remove).
182 GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-3226 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2011) (tracking the status of the CZAR Act, no movement occurred on the legislation
after it was referred to committee on July 15, 2009); GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-3569 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (the SAC Act also remained in
the committee to which it was referred on September 15, 2009).
183 Robin Bravender, House Votes to Overthrow ‘Czars,’ POLITICO (Feb. 17, 2011,
7:20 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/49781.html.
184 Id.
185 See supra Part II.C (providing a constitutional evaluation of the appointment of a czar).
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achieve a level of accountability, efficiency, and oversight, any legislation concerning
the appointment of czars should include two additional restrictions: requiring appear-
ances before and/or reports to congressional committees and vesting removal power
in a person other than the President.  The additional restrictions should maintain con-
sistency with the current structure and traditional understanding of the Appointments
Clause and would further remedy the legislative and public concerns.186
1. Appearances Before or Reports to Congressional Committee
Advisors and presidential assistants have historically not answered calls to appear
before congressional bodies.187  However, simple appearances before legislators would
remove many of the concerns for transparency.  Czars are said to lack “independent
authority or sovereign power.”188  The executive branch maintains that advisors have
no need to report or testify before Congress,189 but it would be helpful for Congress to
hear from the advisor and allow the advisor to articulate the President’s position on spe-
cific policy matters.  Perhaps the number of appearances could be limited in the legisla-
tion, to avoid an undue burden on the czar or his or her ability to advise the President. 
As Obama’s counsel points out, in recent months, some of Obama’s advisors have testi-
fied at the request of Congress.190  However, Obama’s counsel also specifies that the
White House will refuse further requests from Congress for the new czar appointees
to testify.191
2. Authority to Remove Vested with Someone Other than the President
Any provision that limits the appointment power will certainly be subject to con-
troversy and potential constitutional challenge.  Notably, former Supreme Court cases
have discussed the balance of power between Congress and the executive branch over
appointment and inherent removal power.192  “Removal” does not appear in the text
of the Appointments Clause, but the Supreme Court has read the Clause to imply that
the power to appoint implies the power to remove.193  The constitutional issues arise
because Congress attempts to limit the appointment power by vesting removal in an
individual or department, other than the President.194
186 See GERHARDT, supra note 64, at 39–44; supra text accompanying notes 78–80.
187 See Relyea Statement, supra note 11, at 15–16; Byrd Letter, supra note 14 (“[cabinet
officials] rarely testify before congressional committees . . .”).
188 See Letter from Gregory B. Craig, supra note 48.
189 Christopher Neefus, White House to Keep Obama’s ‘Czars’ from Testifying Before
Congress, CNSNews (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/55973.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 See supra Part II.A, II.C.2.
193 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926).
194 Note, Congressional Restrictions on the President’s Appointment Power and the Role
of Longstanding Practice in Constitutional Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1914, 1917
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There are two prevalent and generally accepted views on Congress’s authority
to restrict the President’s appointment and removal power.195  As articulated in a 2007
Harvard Law Review note, these two views are the formalist (“purist”) view and the
functionalist (“office qualifications”) view.196  The purist view is to accept the plain
meaning of the Appointments Clause and recognize that “the President’s nomination
power is illimitable.”197  On the other hand, the opposing view realizes that “Congress
can impose some limited restrictions on the President’s appointment power,”198 and
“the goal of functionalism is to maintain balance between the three branches.”199  The
Supreme Court has not held which view of the Appointments Clause is correct, but in
Buckley v. Valeo, the Court seemed to embrace the formalist view and reject congres-
sional infringement on the President’s appointment power.200
As noted above, several important cases have discussed congressional attempts
to restrict the appointment power.  In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Bowsher v.
Synar;201 at issue was the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that required a legislative
official, the Comptroller, to provide a report on the budget to the President and the
President would then institute reductions after consideration of the Comptroller’s
report.202  The Court invalidated the Act because Congress was, in effect, executing
the laws.203  The Court found that because Congress had the ability to remove the
Comptroller, they were exercising power that is constitutionally mandated to the
President.204  Additionally, the Comptroller was acting like the executive because he
was making policy and interpreting the laws.205  The Bowsher opinion can be viewed
as a formalist judicial opinion.
In Myers v. United States,206 the Supreme Court upheld the power of the President
to remove officials from office.  Myers involved the firing of a postmaster that was in
violation of a Federal law that required removal of the postmaster with the consent
only of the Senate.207  The Court struck down the law that required the consent of the
Senate for removal and indicated that the Appointments Clause vests the power of re-
moval in the President.208  One of the most important aspects of the Myers decision is
(2007); Michael G. Locklar, Comment, Is the 1996 Line-Item Veto Constitutional?, 34 HOUS.
L. REV. 1161, 1181 (1997).
195 Note, supra note 194, at 1917–18.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 1917.
198 Id. at 1920.
199 Locklar, supra note 194, at 1182.
200 See Note, supra note 194, at 1921.
201 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
202 Id. at 717–20.
203 Id. at 732–34.
204 Id. at 732.
205 Id. at 732–34.
206 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
207 Id. at 106.
208 Id. at 176.
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the broad judicial recognition that the power to appoint implies the power to remove,
and only the President has removal power.209
Another case dealing directly with congressional removal power was Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States.210  In Humphrey’s Executor, the Court distinguished the
power of the Federal Trade Commission official and found that the character of the
office was not purely executive.211  Consequently, it was permissible for Congress to
place restrictions on the President’s removal power and provide that the Federal Trade
Commission official could only be removed for specific reasons.212  In this particular
circumstance Congress was able to effectively limit the President’s power to remove.
Examining these precedents, well-crafted legislation could find a way to fit within
the Constitution and remain consistent with the Appointments Clause.  The text of the
Appointments Clause gives Congress the power to vest the appointments,213 but of
primary concern would be the individual or body that would hold the appointment and
removal power.  With the failure of the CZAR and SAC Act legislation, a more com-
prehensive approach, as discussed above, could implement some suitable changes and
assuage much of the criticism.
CONCLUSION
Few people could deny that President Obama’s time in office has included in-
creased criticism over the appointments of czars.  Much of the criticism reflects bipar-
tisan concerns.  Legislators, legal scholars, Facebook subscribers, cable pundits, radio
show hosts, and American taxpayers have directed criticism and demanded changes. 
As detailed in this Note, this appointment practice has an extensive historical tradition
and concerns and protests to this practice existed prior to the Obama administration. 
However, the sharp rise in discontent indicates that the executive branch may have
disturbed the prior legislative and public acquiescence to this practice.
Since the 1940s, presidents have used their appointment power to surround them-
selves with a handful of advisors, but never has a sitting President been surrounded
by forty-four designated policy czars.  While a few have been confirmed by the
209 See id. at 126; Steven Breker-Cooper, The Appointments Clause and the Removal
Power: Theory and Séance, 60 TENN. L. REV. 841, 862–65 (1993) (discussing Myers and
stating,“Congress may reserve no role for itself, nor may it in any way limit the President’s
power to remove.”). Interestingly, this article also discusses the implications of Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), on the President’s removal power. Breker-Cooper,
supra, at 842–44. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–10 (discussing Marbury’s impact on removal).
210 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
211 Id. at 628.
212 Id. at 629–32.
213 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Senate, the majority have not.  Obama, speaking through his legal counsel, expresses
little concern with czar appointments and shows no indication that he will slow the
upward trend.
The public demands transparency, accountability, and oversight from govern-
ment officials.  The President is accountable to the electorate and most constitutionally
appointed officers that serve high level functions in our government must withstand
the rigors of Senate advice and consent, but czars are treated differently.  Czars hold
positions without clear boundaries, serving at the pleasure of the President, but ex-
erting significant responsibility in directing and shaping policy decisions.  Little is
known about most czar appointees and their positions; and most taxpayers would find
it objectionable that a “Great Lakes Czar” and a “Radio-Internet Fairness Czar” are on
the Government payroll amid a significant economic downturn.
This Note has provided context to the friction with the Appointments Clause, but
more importantly, has suggested a solution that will allow for legislative oversight and
accountability, and will promote a more efficient, effective, and transparent executive
branch.  The suggested changes to legislation maintains presidential executive auton-
omy to surround himself with advisors to help make important decisions; upholds the
values of separation of powers and still provides for checks and balances, while impos-
ing congressional removal, consistent with precedent.
The executive branch argues that czars serve only as presidential advisors and do
not dictate policy, however, recent examples have shown otherwise.  The expanded
use of unconfirmed advisors provides for a limitless reach far beyond the accepted
level of executive authority.  Without accountability and oversight, czars are left to
advance government policy and largely dictate the direction of social directives.  The
unchecked power of these advisors raises concerns that could be alleviated through
legislation to define oversight, accountability and reporting.
